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COMMENTS
WHEN IS AN OFFSHORE OILFIELD
WORKER A SEAMAN?
The purpose of this Comment is to consider the classification
of offshore oil workers as "seamen" and "members of a crew of
a vessel in navigation" for purposes of recovery for injury or
death under the Jones Act' and general maritime law.
This area of admiralty law is important to Louisiana. 2 Lou-

isianians probably constitute the great bulk of those persons directly connected with the Louisiana offshore industry. They
pursue a livelihood similar to that of traditional seamen in that
they spend a major portion of their lives on water.
Since the passage of the Jones Act in 1920, maritime workers,
though not seamen in the traditional sense of the word, have
nonetheless sought recovery for personal injuries under the
maritime law relating to seamen; or their survivors have sought
damages for wrongful death of seamen under the Jones Act.
Proceeding under the Jones Act and being classified as a seaman
and member of a crew of a vessel has significant advantages.
An offshore oil field worker injured by his employer's or the
crew's negligence, if covered by the federal 3 or a state compensation statute,4 would receive a limited weekly allowance as compensation without having to prove negligence. Under the Jones
1. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688. The act provides, in part: "Any
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right to trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees
shall apply." For more extensive discussion of the Jones Act see GILMORE &
BLACK, ADMIRALTY 279-96 (1957) ; 2 NORRIS, SEAMEN §§ 653-700 (2d ed. 1962).
2. The oil industry's major domestic offshore operations are off the Louisiana
coast, from the mouth of the Mississippi River west to the Texas coast. In 1966
there were 45 mobile units and 65 fixed platform units in operation with fields
located 85 miles offshore and drilling at greater distances and at greater depths.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, PETROLEUM

PRODUCTION,

DRILLING,

AND

LEASING

(1966).
3. The Lonvshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424
(1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. Compensation for disability or death is payable
on the basis of schedules. A maximum of $24,000 for any compensation received,
except for cases of death or permanent total disability, is provided. In general
the act provides more generous benefits than under state compensation statutes.
4. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 23:1021-1351 (1950).
As under the Longshoremen's
Act benenfits are computed on the basis of 66 2/3 % of the worker's average weekly wage. The Louisiana statute, however, restricts the weekly benefit to a maximum of $35 and the total amount recoverable to 400 weeks, or $14,000, even in
cases of death or permanent total disability. The Longshoremen's Act, on the
other hand, establishes no maximum weekly benefit. A maximum of $24,000 can
ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
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Act there is no statutory limitation of recovery and seamen are
allowed, upon proving negligence, a lump sum recovery for pain
and suffering, loss of past and future earnings, and residual
disability. In addition to the Jones Act remedy seamen can
recover maintenance and cure (a living allowance and medical
expenses) under the general maritime law. A seaman can also
couple his Jones Act claim with a claim based on the general
maritime law warranty of seaworthiness. Although a finding
of both Jones Act negligence and breach of the duty to provide
a seaworthy vessel and safe place to work may not enhance the
amount of the recovery, this dual basis can enhance chances of
recovery by furnishing alternative grounds for liability. The
claimant simply has two independent grounds on which to hold
the shipowner liable when he is found to be a Jones Act seaman.
The doctrine of seaworthiness is especially attractive since it
imposes liability on the shipowner irrespective of negligence.
Another benefit arises when a worker is seriously injured,
undergoes severe conscious pain and suffering, and then dies
as a result of the injury. Under the Jones Act conscious pain
and suffering are recoverable items of damage in a death action, 5 whereas under the federal Death on the High Seas Act"
7
recovery for conscious pain and suffering is not permitted.
Since the principal dangers to life in offshore operations are accidents involving heavy equipment, fires, explosions, or drownings, the possibility of severe pain and suffering between injury
and death becomes an important consideration in a death action
under the Jones Act.
Another generous facet of the Jones Act is the doctrine of
comparative negligence incorporated from the Federal Employers' Liability Acts (FELA). 8 This doctrine reduces the
be received as compensation for all cases except death or permanent total disability. In the latter cases the total payments will depend upon the life expectancy
of the injured worker, or in the case of death, the life expectancy and remarriage

of the widow and the term of minority of any children.
5. Cleveland Tankers v. Tierney, 169 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1948) (recovery under
Jones Act is to include amount for pain and suffering if it is shown that decedent
suffered compensable physical injury resulting in pain and suffering).
6. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767. For more extensive discussion
of the Death on the High Seas Act see 2 NORRIS, SEAMEN §§ 646-652 (2d ed.
1962).
7. Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 91 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1950) (recovery for conscious pain and suffering between time of injury and death is not
permitted under the Death on the High Seas Act).

§§

8. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.

51-60. The applicable provisions of FELA have been incorporated by reference
in the Jones Act and have been made part of the maritime law. Panama R.R.

v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
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amount recovered by a seaman guilty of contributory negligence
but prevents contributory negligence from being a complete bar
to his action. Trial by jury is provided as an option to the
seaman who feels that his financial interests may be better
served thereby. Since it was established that the question of

seaman status is essentially one of fact for jury resolution, marine laborers of all descriptions have sought recovery as seamen,
and juries have responded sympathetically by enlarging the class
of Jones Act seamen to include common laborers,9 handymen, 10
pile drivers," and, in the area of offshore oil activities, to mem2
bers of a drilling crew.1
SEAMEN: THE "WARDS OF ADMIRALTY"

Rights of seamen are derived from the judicially declared
general maritime law and from federal statutes. 13 As "wards
of admiralty," seamen have been accorded unique rights and
remedies. The basic remedies available under the maritime law
are recovery of maintenance, cure, and wages and recovery of
an "indemnity" for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of a
4
vessel.'
Maintenance, Cure and Wages
A seaman who is injured or falls ill while in the service of the
ship is entitled to maintenance and cure until recovery or the
9. Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1953) (laborer lived on barge; his duties were limited to levelling gravel pumped
onto barge from river bottom).
10. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Co., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) (although he lived
at home and took most of his meals there, he worked an eight-hour shift aboard the
dredge and all of his duties were performed on or for the benefit of the dredge).
11. Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 (1958).
12. Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 (1955) reversing Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Marine Drilling Co. v. Autin, 363 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1966) ; Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966) ;
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Guilbeau v. Falcon
Seaboard Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1902) held that the effect of this provision was to incorporate the accepted rules of the general maritime law as part of
the laws of the United States and empower Congress to legislate in respect to
them and other matters within the maritime jurisdiction.
14. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) is viewed as the classic statement of a
seaman's rights against the vessel and her owner under the general maritime law.
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point of maximum cure. 15 Unearned wages may be recovered
to the end of the voyage (in the case of ocean-going vessels) or
for the term signed (in the case of coastal shipping), or until
the seaman recovers, whichever occurs first. This liability, imposed on the shipowner irrespective of fault, is based on the employment relationship. Historically, it is justified as an inducement for men to undertake what is inherently an arduous and
hazardous livelihood. Although the justifications'for the "wardship doctrine" have vanished because of technical advances in
engineering changing the shape and concept of vessels, higher
educational standards, social legislation, unions, and collective
bargaining, the courts persist in relying on the doctrine to jus-

tify awards to seamen in the most unusual cases.16
The seaman's contributory negligence will neither defeat recovery of maintenance, cure, and wages nor reduce his award.17
Only injury or illness caused through his willful misconduct or
gross negligence or incurred prior to employment and knowingly
concealed bars this recovery.'" This remedy has been generously

allowed. The federal courts now allow recovery of maintenance,
cure, and wages where the seaman is injured or falls ill while
on authorized shore leave. The causal relation between injury
and employment in such cases is deemed satisfied because rest
and relaxation beyond the ship's confines is viewed as essential
to the harmonious functioning of the ship's work. 19
15. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). This remedy is not intended as compensation or damages for personal injuries sustained in the course
of employment. Although it is sometimes referred to as a kind of non-statutory
workmen's compensation (liability without fault) the comparison stops there because the remedy is not restricted to actual scope of employment and is not the
seaman's exclusive remedy. It has been compared to a system of health and accident insurance at the shipowner's expense. GOMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 254
(1957). For more extensive discussion of maintenance and cure see id. at 253-77;
1 NoRRis, SEAMEN §§ 536-608 (2d ed. 1962).
16. In 1897 Justice Holmes admonished the courts: "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds on which it was laid down
have vanished long ago and the rule simply persists from blind obedience to the
past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HABv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
17. The seaman's contributory negligence operates to reduce his claims under
the Jones Act and under the warranty of seaworthiness. 1 NoaRs, SEAMEN § 549
(2d ed. 1962).
18. Concealment of pre-existing injury or illness: Rosenquist v. Isthmian
Steamship Co., 205 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953). Willful misconduct or gross negligence: Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951) ; Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511 (1949) ; Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
19. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943) ; Smith v. United Sl:ates,
167 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1948). Recent cases allow from six -to eight dollart per
day in accord with this remedy. See, e.g., Hanson v. Reiss Steamship Co., 184
F. Supp. 545 (D. Del. 1960).
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Warranty of Seaworthiness
The shipowner also owes the seaman an absolute warranty of
reasonable fitness of the vessel, her gear, appliances, and equip-

ment.20 Indemnity awards are justified on the theory that seamen, unlike landbased workers, cannot while at sea quit their
employment or object to the circumstances surrounding the work
ordered. Although the duty has been held to be absolute and
non-delegable, the quality of the ship or her appurtenances need
not be perfect or the most modern. All that is required is reason-

able fitness for intended use.2 ' The warranty of seaworthiness
originated solely for the benefit of members of a crew. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has extended the ship-

owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship and a safe place to
work to longshoremen, shoreside employees, and other land-based

personnel aboard the vessel and contributing to her mission.2
The Court has predicated this extension on the theory that such
workers become subject to some of the same dangers as members
of the crew and should be accorded similar protection. Recently,
this right has been extended to cases where the injury is caused
by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel taking effect when
the worker is not on board, as where he is on the dock.2 The
damages recovered under this warranty are in addition to maintenance, cure, and wages.
Statutory Remedies
The general maritime law does not provide a remedy for
wrongful death 24 nor for injury caused by negligence.2 5 Unless
20. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960) ; McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158
(1903). For a more extensive discussion of seaworthiness see GILMORE & BLACK,
ADMIRALTY 315-33 (1957) ; 2 NoRiS, SEAMEN §§ 609-630 (2d ed. 1962).
21. Baudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) ; Lester v. United
States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956).
22. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (shoreside employee
on board ship to adjust cargo-loading apparatus) ; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946) (longshoreman); cf. Matherne v. Superior Oil Co., 207 F.
Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1962) (truck driver on board barge with load of pipe for
delivery at drilling site held owed duty of providing seaworthy vessel).
23. Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (longshoreman unloading ship's cargo of beans on dock slipped on spilled beans). This decision has been viewed as a step toward making shipowners insurers of all injuries
to longshoremen and other land-based workers engaged in servicing the vessel.
BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OR THE SUPREME COURT 31-35 (1963, Supp. 1966).
For
a view that the law of recovery for maritime injuries will soon be stated exclusively in terms of seavorthiness, see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315-16 (1957).
24. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Lines, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932) ; Lindgren v.
United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
25. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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unseaworthiness brought about the disability, the seaman was
entitled to no more than maintenance, cure, and wages. In
1920 Congress enacted the Death on the High Seas Act and the
Jones Act to provide such remedies. The Death on the High
Seas Act establishes a cause of action for wrongful death oc-

curring beyond a marine league from the shore of any state
(three geographic miles). The general effect of the Jones Act is
to extend to seamen the same recovery based upon negligence

enjoyed by railroad employees under the Federal Employers'
Liability Acts.

The act covers any seaman suffering personal

injury or death in the course of his employment on navigable
waters. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Jones

Act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed. 26
The important determinations to be made under the Jones
Act are, first, whether the worker is employed on a "vessel" and
second, whether the worker's status is that of a "seaman."

It

has been stated that "almost any structure that once floated or
is capable of floating on navigable waters '27 is a "vessel" for
28

Jones Act purposes. Many special purpose craft such as dredges,

floating derricks, 29 and barges equipped for special purposes 0
are today considered vessels. Persons regularly employed aboard

or assigned to such a vessel in the furtherance of its purposes
are classified as Jones Act seamen. 31 For purposes of general
admiralty jurisdiction Congress has defined "vessel" to include
"every description of water craft or other artificial contrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water.

'3 2

Although the seaman must be employed aboard a ves-

sel "in navigation" to recover under the Jones Act, the question
of whether the vessel is "in navigation" is a question of fact for
26. E.g., Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949)
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Lines, 287 U.S. 367, 375 (1932).
27. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1959).
28. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) ; McKie v. Diamond
Marine, 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Gahagan Constr. Corp. v. Armao, 165
F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Kibadeaux v. Standard Dredging Co., 81 F.2d 670
(5th Cir. 1936) ; Early v. American Dredging Co., 101 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa.
1951).
29. Summerlin v. Massman Constr. Co., 199 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1952).
30. Submersible drilling barges: Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 (1955),
reversing Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Marine Drilling
Co. v. Autin, 363 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361
F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.
1959) ; Cheramie v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1.965 A.M.C. 2063. Barge employed in
dredging gravel from river bottom: Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co.,
202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1953).
31. See Comment, 32 TUL. L. REV. 292 (1958) (barge and dredge workers as
Jones Act seamen).
32. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1947).
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jury determination and will not be upset where there is sufficient evidence to support it.3 "In navigation" has been given
a liberal meaning. Vessels unloading or loading at a dock, undergoing relatively minor repairs in a shipyard, or otherwise temporarily immobilized but still floatable, are still considered in
navigation.34 Offshore floating drilling platforms and barges
have recently been held, as a matter of law, to be vessels although
they function primarily as part of the drilling equipment and
only to a minimum extent as a means of transportation.
Determination of the "seaman status" necessary for the
worker aboard the vessel to bring a claim under the Jones Act
is only now becoming settled. Since seaman status carries with
it unusual rights, an analysis of the development of the law of
status determination seems useful.
SEAMAN STATUS: FROM SEARCH FOR DEFINITION
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Evolution of seaman status under the Jones Act can be divided into three stages. The first-from 1926 to the late 1950'sreflected confusion as to whether seaman status should be resolved by a jury as a question of fact or by the judge as a question of law. The second stage came in the late 1950's when it
was clearly recognized that seaman status was a question of fact
for the jury to resolve. This development reached its high point
when the requirements for the evidentiary basis necessary before
the case could go to the jury were set forth in Offshore Co. v.
Robison.35 This stage is also significant because the extremely
broad and flexible guidelines set out in Robison had the effect
of shifting the definitional process to the jury as a matter of
factual determination. The third stage of development, initiated
by Producers' Drilling Co. v. Gray,"e recognizes that a claimant
33. Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 (1958) (tug withdrawn from actual
navigation several months before accident held vessel "in navigation"). Cf. Gonzales v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 2 F.2d 168 (D.N.Y.
1924) ; Kling v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 992 (D.N.Y. 1930) (vessels definitely
withdrawn from navigation not "in navigation"). Relying on the definition of
"vessel" in 46 U.S.C. § 713 ("every description of vessel navigating" (emphasis
added) ) the federal courts have read into the Jones Act the requirement that the
vessel be "in navigation" in order for the worker to recover as a seaman. See,
e.g., Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
34. Early v. American Dredging Co., 101 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1951) ; Hunt
v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), affirmed, 91 F.2d 1014 (9th
Cir. 1937).
35. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
36. 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966).
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can get a directed verdict or summary judgment on the question
of status in the appropriate case.
Question of Fact v. Question of Law
Early decisions were intent on formulating and refining a
legal definition of "seaman" in accord with the intent of Congress under the Jones Act. In International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 7 the Supreme Court adopted a liberal interpretation
of the term and reasoned that Congress intended to classify as
seamen under the Jones Act men engaged in traditional maritime
duties on navigable waters. The Court admitted that the word
as commonly used would not include a longshoreman. But,
notwithstanding what "seaman" might mean in other laws, under
the Jones Act a worker rendering maritime service of the nature
normally rendered by the ship's crew was entitled to protection
as a seaman because he incurred seaman's hazards. In Haverty,
a longshoreman was injured while aboard the ship loading
cargo-a service which the Court viewed as traditionally rendered by seamen.
Eight years later, in Warner v. Goltra,38 the Court stated that
its concern was "to define the meaning of [seaman] for the purpose of a particular statute which must be read in the light of
the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. ' ' 39 In
an attempt to achieve this task, the Court cited The Buena Ventura,4 0 a case pre-dating the Jones Act, for the proposition that
"seaman" undoubtedly once meant only persons who could "hand,
reef and steer," but that since the necessities of shipping had increased, the word had expanded its meaning. "In a broad sense,
a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon
the sea. It is enough that what he does affects 'the operation
and welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage.' "41 In The
Buena Ventura a wireless operator was held to be a seaman under the general maritime law. In Warner the Court concluded
that Jones Act seaman status extended to the master of a tugboat who drowned through the negligence of a pilot engaged to
navigate the tug.
In South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett,42 a 1940 case,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

272 U.S. 50 (1926).
293 U.S. 155 (1934).
Id. at 158.
243 Fed. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934).
309 U.S. 251 (1940).
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the Supreme Court rendered a significant decision on the question of seaman status which was apparently not fully understood
by the lower federal courts until it was explained and elaborated
upon by the Court some seventeen years later in Senko v. La
Crosse Dredging Corp.13 and Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile
Co.44 In Bassett decedent was employed aboard a barge used for
supplying coal to vessels; he performed no duties while the lighter
was in transit between the dock and vessels. The Court held
that the effect of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927 was to provide compensation to a class
of employees working on vessels in navigation, who, although
they might be classed as seamen were still regarded as distinct
from "members of a crew" of a vessel. "They were persons
serving on vessels, to be sure, but their service was that of
laborers, of the sort performed by longshoremen and harbor
workers and thus distinguished from those employees on the
vessel who are naturally and primarily on board to aid in her
navigation. '45 (Emphasis added.) The Court then stated that
whether a particular worker was a "member of a crew" entitled
to recover under the Jones Act was a question of fact which once
determined upon sufficient evidence was conclusive. It held
that there was sufficient evidence to support the commissioner's
finding that the decedent was not a member of a crew and that
his remedy was the Longshoremen's Act. The fact that the
Court had earlier concerned itself with defining seaman perhaps
suggests that it felt that the issue of status was a matter of law;
however, on petitioner's contention that the question was one of
law, the Court concluded that, though the facts of the case might
be undisputed, the term "crew" had no absolute or unvarying
legal meaning. This meaning must be determined with reference
to the purpose of the particular statute in which it is used and
the decedent's actual duties, the latter being a question of fact
for the jury to decide.
In Gahagan Const. Corp. v. Armao,4 6 a 1948 case, the First
Circuit considered the Jones Act claim of a deckhand injured
while employed on a dredge. The Court cited Bassett and the
Supreme Court's affirmance of Norton v. Warner 7 in upholding
the trial judge's instructions to the jury that in order to be a
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

352
356
309
165
137

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
F.2d
F.2d

370 (1957).
252 (1958).
251, 260 (1940).
301 (lst Cir. 1948).
57 (3d Cir. 1944), affirmed, 321 U.S. 565 (1944).
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Jones Act seaman "there must be a connection with a vessel, and
that the person must play some part in connection with the labor
about the operationand welfare of the vessel while in navigable
waters.

' 48

(Emphasis added.)

In Norton, the First Circuit

noted, the Supreme Court had again defined "crew" as those
persons naturally and primarily aboard in aid of navigation, but
had gone on to state that "navigation" was not to be limited to
"putting over the helm"; it embraces duties necessary for other
purposes. The Supreme Court had said that "crew" included all
those who contribute to the operation and welfare of the ship
when on a voyage. The First Circuit then cited its own decision
in Carumbo v. Cape Cod. S.S. Co. 49 where it had stated that the

essential and decisive elements of the definition of a "member
of a crew" were: (1) that the ship be in navigation, (2) that
there be a more or less permanent connection with the vessel,
and (3) that the worker be aboard primarily in aid of navigation. "It is important to note that one is aiding in navigation
even though he happens to be a cook or an engineer; the whole
ship's company is aiding in navigation." ' 0
The first case classifying offshore oil field workers as seamen and members of the crew of a vessel was decided in 1955.
In Texas Co. v. Gianfala5t decedent was killed while operating
a hydraulic lift used in unloading drilling pipe. Drilling operations were being conducted on a submersed drilling barge resting
on bottom at the time of death; the barge was held in place by
pilings and had been in that position some twenty-two days.
Decedent worked six days on and six days off and was transported by speedboat to a land camp where members of the drilling
crew ate and slept. One of his duties was to participate in the
raising and sinking of the barge. When the rig was to be moved,
he opened and closed the seacock valves which jetted water out of
the barge compartments. He would then ride the tending boiler
barge to the new drilling site, whereupon he assisted in sinking
the barge by opening the valves and allowing the barge compartments to be flooded. The crewmen of the barge never signed
seamen's articles, nor did they sleep aboard the barge. They
48. 165 F.2d 301, 306 (lst Cir. 1948).
49. 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941).
50. Id. at 995.
51. 222 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1955). In denying respondent's motion for directed
verdict the district judge relied on the traditional legal requirements for status
as a "member of a crew" set forth in McKie v. Diamond Marine, 204 F.2d 132
(5th Cir. 1953) (which in turn actually cites the requirements formulated in
Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941)).
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were paid by the hour (and not by the month or voyage as are
customary seamen), received overtime pay when they worked
over the legal limit for one week, and could quit their employment at will. In the district court, the respondent drilling company moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the deceased
was not a seaman or a member of a crew of a vessel. The district
judge denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict for the
libelant.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that where the facts are
undisputed there is no question for the jury, only a question of
law for the judge. It held that there was no room for different
conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence. The Court
felt that Mrs. Gianfala was urging the theory that whether a
person is a seaman and a member of a crew is always a question
for the jury. Mrs. Gianfala's counsel was actually expressing
the view espoused by the Supreme Court in Bassett that where
the question to be resolved is not merely facts testified to, but
what inferences might or should be drawn, there may yet be
room for a jury verdict although the facts testified to are not
in dispute. The Court concluded that when the accident occurred
the vessel was not in navigation, nor was the decedent aboard
in aid of navigation or as a member of the ship's crew, but as
a member of a drilling crew. Martin had been engaged in work
done strictly and uniquely by oil field workers which had no
relation to navigation. On certiorari the United States Supreme
52
Court reversed without discussion.
Requirement of an Evidentiary Basis
The doubts created by the per curiam reversal of Gianfala
were resolved by the Supreme Court in Senko v. La Crosse
54
Dredging Corp.53 and Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.
Senko, a handyman employed on a dredge anchored to shore, was
injured in the course of his employment while ashore; he brought
suit under the Jones Act. The jury returned a favorable verdict.
The court of appeals, however, set the verdict aside on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that
Senko was a member of a crew. The Supreme Court cited
52. In its per curiam at 350 U.S. 879 (1955), the Supreme Court cited South
Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940) ; Wilkes v. Mississippi
River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Summerlin v. Massman
Constr. Co., 199 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Gahagan Const. Corp. v. Armao,
165 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1948).
53. 352 U.S. 370 (1957).
54. 356 U.S. 252 (1958).
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Bassett for the purpose of restating the principle that whether
an employee is a "member of a crew" turns on questions of fact
and that if a finding on this question has sufficient evidence to
support it, the finding is conclusive. Since no issue of whether
the barge was a vessel at the time of Senko's injury was raised,
the Supreme Court asserted that the sole question presented was
whether there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's finding that
petitioner was a member of a crew at the time of his injury.
The circuit court had concluded that Senko was not "naturally
and primarily aboard in aid of navigation" and as a matter of
law could not maintain an action under the Jones Act. The
Supreme Court admitted that the facts were undisputed and uncontradicted, but concluded that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that Senko was permanently attached to and employed by the dredge as a member of its crew.
The Court noted that Senko performed substantially all of his
duties on or for the dredge and that when the dredge would be
put in transit he would have a "significant navigational function."'5 5 The majority felt that the jury could from these facts
reasonably infer that Senko was a member of the dredge's
crew. In its concluding remarks, the Court stated that its decision in Bassett had not been fully understood:
"Our holding there that the determination of whether an
injured person was a 'member of a crew' is to be left to the
finder of fact meant that juries have the same discretion they
have in finding negligence or any other fact. The essence
of the discretion is that a jury's decision is final if it has
a reasonable basis, whether or not the appellate court agrees
with the jury's estimate." 56 (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court repeated this reasoning in Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. 57 and in its denial of certiorari in Texas
Co. v. Savoie.58 Following the Senko decision the lower federal
courts began to reflect accurately the statement of law set forth
in Bassett.
Savoie involved a Jones Act claim by survivors of an oil field
worker employed on fixed platforms. Decedent was killed when
a valve exploded and blew him off the well platform into the
55. 352 U.S. 370, 374 (1957).
56. Ibid.

57. 356 U.S. 252 (1958).
58. 240 F.2d 674 (Sth Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 885 (1957).
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water. Decedent had been transported from platform to platform by a lugger. The contention was made that he was acting
as a member of the crew of the vessel in its operations on a navigable body of water. The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment in
favor of the claimants, stating that whether there was substantial
evidence to support the jury's finding that he was a member of
a crew was a question of law. The court asserted, however, that
a jury question was presented even where there was no conflict
in the evidence if reasonable minds could fairly draw, from the
same evidence, conflicting inferences requiring different verdicts. The court also noted that the judge could direct a verdict
if there was no issue of fact to be submitted to the jury on a
decisive issue and there was no conflict in the evidence which
might allow reasonable minds to fairly draw conflicting inferences from the same evidence. It concluded that the decedent
was employed to work on fixed platforms and not on the lugger.
He was strictly an oil field worker; his duties had no connection
with the vessel "not even the casual task of throwing a rope or
making the boat fast, a service that readily could be performed
by a harbor worker .... He was merely a passenger." 59 From
these undisputed facts the Fifth Circuit held, as a matter of law,
that there was no substantial evidence to support a jury finding
that he was a member of a crew. The Supreme Court denied
writs6 0
In Perez v. Marine Transport Lines 1 the district court focused on the aspect of the legal requirements to constitute one a
member of a crew. Perez foreshadowed the decision in Offshore
Co. v. Robison62 by stating that the common sense, or real test
of the coverage of the Jones Act is not whether the claimant is a
seaman "assisting in navigation of the vessel" or whether the
vessel herself is in navigation, but whether the claimant is more
or less permanently employed aboard a vessel in a capacity contributing to the accomplishment of her mission. Perez, a seaman by trade, was hired for the specific purpose of cleaning the
ship's tanks and not as a regular member of the crew. The court
held that he was not a member of the vessel's crew at the time
of his injury and that his exclusive remedy was under the
Longshoremen's Act.
With the Gianfala,Senko, and Grimes series of cases behind
59.
60.
61.
62.

240
355
160
266

F.2d 674, 675 (5th Cir. 1957).
U.S. 885 (1957).
F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1958).
F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
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it the Fifth Circuit approached Offshore Co. v. Robison with
some degree of stability as to what the legal requirements were
for a maritime worker to be a "seaman." Robison was injured
while employed in drilling operations aboard a submersible drilling barge and brought his claim under the Jones Act. Judge
Wisdom noted that the common denominators of the earlier decisions were that the claimants were not ordinarily thought of as
"seamen" aboard "primarily in aid of navigation." They served
the vessel in the sense that the work they performed fit in with
the function that the vessel served and the vessels were not
conventional vessels but special purpose structures. Martin, in
the GianfaZla case, was a member of a drilling crew on a drilling
barge; Gahagan, a deckhand on a dredge; Wilkes, a common laborer on a dredge; and Summerlin, a fireman on a derrick. Judge
Wisdom also noted that Bassett was the sole decision which spoke
in terms of requiring that the worker be aboard the vessel primarily to aid in navigation. He concluded, however, that the
real issue in Bassett did not involve the legal requirements to
constitute one a member of a crew but the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify a decision under the Longshoremen's Act.
After concluding that the question of status as a member of a
crew was one properly for jury determination where the required
evidentiary basis is met, Judge Wisdom stated that on the basis
of the jurisprudence under the Jones Act there is a legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for the case to go the jury:
"(1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was assigned permanently to a vessel (including special purpose
structures not usually employed as a means of transport by
water but designed to float on water), or performed a substantial part of his work on the vessel, and (2) if the capacity
in which he was employed or the duties which he performed
contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or welfare of the
vessel in terms of maintenance during the movement or during anchorage for its future trips. '6 3 (Emphasis added.)
In regard to the district court's minimal instructions concerning the earlier "aboard primarily to aid in navigation" requirement, Judge Wisdom stated that a review of the cases revealed that this test had been "watered down until the words
have lost their natural meaning. '64 The Fifth Circuit preferred
63. Id. at 779.
64. Id. at 780.
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to disregard this "catch-phrase" as well as the Supreme Court's
observation in Senko that the jury might infer that Senko would
have "significant navigational functions" when the dredge was in
transit, in preference to the many cases allowing recovery where
it could not possibly be said that the claimant had anything to do
with navigation, but was viewed as a member of a crew nonetheless because his duties had a connection with the mission or
function of the floatable structure on which he was injured. 65
It is submitted that the cases which eroded the requirement
of being aboard primarily in aid of navigation operated not so
much to "water down" the natural meaning of those words as to
recognize a changed state of affairs. In a sense Robison stands
as a second Buena Ventura" heralding the fact that the "necessities of shipping have indeed increased" and that the test of
primarily aiding in navigation is outdated and unsuitable to
cases involving special purpose craft not primarily suited for
navigation. Despite the fact that these structures are not employed primarily as a means of transportation on water, they
incur many of the hazards traditional vessels incur. In some
cases more perilous risks are present, such as the risks incidental
to oil drilling. Since there is a reasonable basis and justification
for classifying such structures as vessels it seems only fitting
that the next logical stage is to discard the traditional Jones Act
seaman test requiring that the nature of the actual duties be
primarily in aid of navigation, for a new test emphasizing substantial connection with the vessel and duties contributing to her
mission. The requirements of the economy have multipled; it
is only reasonable that the law should provide a realistic test
in accord with current conditions.
Robison was not without precedent. The Supreme Court
itself emphasized permanent connection with the vessel and that
the worker played some part in connection with duties affecting
the operation and welfare of the vessel in affirming Norton v.
65. Cf. Bowers v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 422 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1967), where the
Alaska Supreme Court applied the apparently outdated tests of being aboard "in
aid of navigation" and expected to perform "a significant navigational function"
to a worker injured aboard a barge loading and unloading materials. The court
cited\Bassett and Senko for the tests and held that since the worker was not
aboard "primarily in aid of navigation" nor did he perform, or was he expected
to perform "a significant navigational function" in regard to the barge but only
to unload and load it, he was not a seaman. The court apparently chose to
disregard the Robison guidelines because it did cite Rotolo and Thibodeaux. The
result of applying Robison would have been the same because the employee was
not more or less permanently assigned to the barge nor did he perform a substantial
portion of his duties on board the barge.
66. 243 Fed. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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Warner 7 and again in Senko. In 1956 the Second Circuit stated
that the nature of the claimant's duties aboard a vessel is not
the controlling factor and that he need not be serving in a strictly
navigational capacity. 8 Cases subsequent to Robison can be discussed in terms of how the requirements it set forth have been
followed.
Directed Verdict or Summary Judgment in ProperCase
One series of cases applying the Robison requirements has
established the rule that since the status question is essentially
an issue of fact for the jury there can be no summary judgment
in favor of the respondent if the two requirements are met. The
effect of fulfilling the evidentiary requirements is to place material fact issues in dispute. In Stanley v. Guy Scroggins Constr.
Co. 9 and Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc.70 the
Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgments in favor of respondents on the ground that the Robison requirements had been met.
Stanley was a construction worker pumping concrete into pilings
of an offshore stationary platform. He lived on the vessel which
contained cement and pumps used in the operations and divided
his working time between the vessel and the fixed platform. In
Braniff decedent was a foreman in charge of maintaining a fleet
of ferries who often made repairs while the vessel was in transit.71

A second series of cases stands for the proposition that the
issue of seaman and member of a crew status is not always a
question of fact for the jury to determine. Where the requirements of Robison are not met and no material issue of fact is in
dispute the judge may hold, as a matter of law, that the claimant is not a member of a crew. In Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.7 2 the judge directed a verdict for respondents be-

cause the requirement that the injured workman be assigned
permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his work
on the vessel was not met. Thibodeaux was a regular land-based
welder who lived and slept at home. He was neither assigned
nor attached to any particular vessel, either as a member of a
67. 137 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1943), affirmed, 321 U.S. 565 (1944).
68. Weiss v. Central R.R. Co. of N.H., 235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956), citing
A.L. Mechling Barge Line v. Bassett, 119 F.2d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 1941).
69. 297 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1961).
70. 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1960).
71. The Court stressed the fact that he was permanently assigned to a specific
group of vessels and helped them complete their respective missions.
72. 276 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1960).
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crew or otherwise. His relation to the barge on which he was
injured was purely transitory. His sole remedy was the Longshoremen's Act. A directed verdict for the respondent was also
upheld in Rotolo v. Halliburton Co.,7 3 in which a welder did
occasional repair work on the company's vessels either at the
base or at the wharf where they were moored. Decedent was
killed while carrying out one of these repair jobs. The court
granted the directed verdict on the ground that Rotolo's work
in connection with the vessels was only sporadic and that he was
74
not permanently assigned to any vessel or group of vessels.
The third distinct series of cases reflect instances where the
Robison requirements have been met and the case given to the
jury for determination. In Adams v. Kelly Drilling Co.7 5 claimant was employed on a submersible drilling barge resting on the
bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff moved for a directed
verdict on the status issue, but was overruled, and the jury returned a verdict for the respondent. The Fifth Circuit affirmed saying that the jury verdict was final since there was
evidence to support it.
In Ledet v. United Stdtes Oil of Louisiana, Inc.76 and Guilbeau v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co.7 the claimants, members
of drilling crews aboard submersible drilling barges, were held
to be seamen under the Jones Act. The Robison requirements
were met since they were both employed on vessels (submersible
drilling barges and mobile platforms are now unquestionably recognized as vessels), contributed to fulfilling the vessel's mission,
and were assigned to their respective vessels more or less permanently.
Cases involving fixed platforms present a more perplexing
situation. In Sirmons v. Baxter Drilling Co.78 a derrickman
performed all of his duties and lived on a fixed platform. His
duties were of the character normally performed in land-based
employment. He had no maritime duties on the crewboat which
73. 317 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852 (1W93). See also
Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 200 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affirmed,
314 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963).
74. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Rotolo from Braniff on the basis that the
worker in Braniff regularly performed a substantial part of his work on every
one of the several vessels, whereas the worker in Rotolo did not perform a substantial part of his work on a specific boat or group of boats, and the work was
transitory in character.
75. 273 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1960). cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960).
76. 237 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 2964).
77. 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963).
78. 239 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. La. 1965).
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transported him to the rig. The court relied on the Robison
requirements and held that Sirmons was not a seaman entitled
to Jones Act benefits because the rig was not a vessel in navigation. His exclusive remedy, the court held, was under the Longshoremen's Act. In Ross v. Delta Drilling Co.7 9 a roughneck
regularly stationed on a fixed drilling platform was injured while
mixing drilling mud on the deck of a tender supporting the drilling operations. Since he divided his work between the stationary
platform and what was concedely a vessel, the question of seaman
status was presented to the jury. When the jury was unable
to render a verdict, the parties, by stipulation, tried the case
before the judge. Ross was held not to be a seaman for Jones
Act purposes because his primary duties were in connection with
the stationary platform and he lacked the necessary identification with the vessel which would have been present had he performed a more substantial portion of his work on the tending
vessel. Though Ross is of doubtful value as precedent, the case
itself is significant since the issue of status was allowed first
to go to the jury after the Robison requirements were apparently
met.
The latest development in this area has been the granting
of a summary judgment or directed verdict in favor of the claimant in the "appropriate case." In Producers' Drilling Co. v.
Gray80 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a directed verdict in favor of
a roustabout injured in drilling operations on a submersed inland
drilling barge. Although the claimant did not sleep or eat aboard
the barge, he was transported to the location each day by crewboat and participated in chipping and painting, in lowering and
raising the barge, and in handling mooring lines. Before the
Fifth Circuit, respondents argued the decision in Adams v. Kelly
Drilling Co.,"' where the district court denied claimant's motion
for directed verdict on the issue of status and the jury's verdict
was returned and entered into judgment for the respondent.
The Fifth Circuit noted that no significant factual distinction
could be drawn between the case at bar and Adams; however, it
limited its task to a determination of whether developments since
Adams might require a different result. The Court answered in
the affirmative and impliedly overruled Adams by holding that
there would have been no reasonable evidentiary basis to support
79. 213 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1962).
80. 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966).
81. 273 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960).
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a jury finding that Gray was not a seaman and member of a
crew of a vessel or that the barge was not a vessel.
In Marine Drilling Co. v. Autin 2 the Fifth Circuit considered
a Jones Act claim arising out of an injury sustained during drilling on an offshore barge. Respondent contended that the judge's
charge amounted to directing a verdict for the plaintiff. The
Fifth Circuit held that the charge, which essentially spelled out
the Robison guidelines, was correct and not in the nature of a
directed verdict.8 3 The court added, however, that it considered
the law applicable to offshore oil workers developed to the point
that in the proper case it would be appropriate for the judge to
direct a verdict for the claimant on both status questions.
In the recent unreported case of Daws v. Movible Offshore,
Inc.8 4 the district judge granted a motion in favor of the plaintiff
for summary judgment on the questions of status of a movable
derrick barge as a vessel and the plaintiff's status as a Jones
Act seaman. Daws was injured while employed as a crane operator on the derrick barge. The district judge noted that motions
for summary judgments and for directed verdicts are alike in
that neither may be granted unless there is no material issue
of fact in dispute and differ only as to the time presented. Relying primarily on Autin, he concluded that if it is obvious, before
trial, that there is no factual dispute and it does not appear
that evidence will be introduced at the trial to raise a dispute as
to the facts, a motion for summary judgment should be granted.
RAMIFICATIONS

Mobile Barges and Platforms
It seems settled that a worker injured aboard a submersible
drilling barge or mobile platform while a member of the rig's
crew will be able to recover under the Jones Act and maritime
law as a seaman. Anyone who is more or less permanently employed on or assigned to such a vessel and does substantial work
82. 363 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966).
83. The district court's charge is reprinted id. at 580-81: "He does not have
to live aboard to be a seaman. The important question is whether or not he did
seaman's work and whether or not he contributed substantially to the mission of
the vessel." Id. at 581. The "not having to live aboard" observation seems implicit in the Robison test and would cover the tender and fixed platform situations.
84. No. 14,978 (E.D. La. March 3, 1967). A successful summary judgment
on the status issue can be valuable to the plaintiff because it forces the defendant to pay maintenance and cure immediately. Maintenance and cure and
Longshoremen's Act benefits are often discontinued pending outcome of the
suit when the worker sues-under the Jones Act.
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in connection with fulfilling the vessel's mission will be considered, as a matter of law, to be a seaman under the Jones Act.
The logical consequence of holding workers on dredges and submersible drilling barges to be Jones Act seamen is to also extend
to them the remedies of maintenance and cure and the warranty
of seaworthiness under the general maritime law. Thus, it is
submitted that if an offshore employee on a submersible barge
or dredge is seriously injured, even if through his own negligence, while home from his "hitch" or on his way to work, the
"shore leave" doctrine under the general maritime law entitles
him to maintenance and cure. 85
The submersible barge or mobile platform, however, is not
the sole method of conducting offshore drilling. Depending on
water depth, alternatives are the small platform and floating
tender or the self-contained platform. In the former the fixed
platform houses the rig and drilling equipment while the tender
is used to store accessory equipment and supplies and serves as
living quarters for the drilling crew. The self-contained fixed
platform, on the other hand, has sufficient space to house personnel, supplies, and equipment and allow working area for the rig
and its auxiliary equipment. Offshore production operations are
customarily limited to the use of fixed platforms. Production
platforms house completed wells, storage tanks, supplies, and
equipment. Separate platforms are utilized for living quarters
for production personnel and related workers. These stationary
platform and tending vessel situations present more perplexing
problems when attempting to determine seaman status.
Fixed PlatformWith Standby and Service Craft
Although the, law of seaman status appears to be relatively
settled in the case of fixed drilling or production platforms, many
problems remain. One stems from the language used by the
Fifth Circuit in Savoie.86 It was stated there that the decedent
was strictly an oil field worker employed in connection with
stationary well platforms and had no duties whatsoever on board
the water-taxi used to transport him from platform to platform;
he did not even have the incidental task of throwing a rope or
catching mooring lines. This observation presents the question
of whether employees or other subcontractors, such as electricians, fishing tool employees, or welders permanently employed
83. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
86. 240 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 855 U.S. 840 (1957).
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on or assigned to a fixed platform can be converted into Jones
Act seamen by performing seaman's chores while aboard a standby vessel or crewboat engaged, operated, or owned by their employer.87 These duties could be performed while aboard the
crewboat used to transport personnel to and from the fixed structure or at some time during regular work in connection with
drilling, production, or related operations.
Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.8 and the Robison test
indicate that incidental seaman's work while aboard a crewboat
or standby vessel will not be sufficient to convert such an employee into a Jones Act seaman. In Grimes decedent assisted
in the completion of a "Texas Tower," a metal platform permanently affixed to the ocean floor and used to operate as a radar
warning station. Decedent lived on the tower while it was towed
out to sea aboard a barge, prepared it for installation at the permanent location, and performed certain functions to keep the
tower in safe tow. After the tower was anchored decedent performed only pile-driving duties. Six days after the tower had
been permanently fixed he was sent to a nearby supply barge to
help prepare materials for transfer to the tower. Grimes drowned when the life ring used to transfer personnel from the tug
to the tower collided with the pilot house of the tug and caused
him to fall. The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that
there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury for
status determination. The Court, however, did not elaborate
what facts constituted the sufficient evidentiary basis as it had
done in Senko.
In a vigorous dissent Justice Harlan assailed the majority's
conclusion and asserted that he was unable to see how a jury
acting reasonably could find the petitioner to be a Jones Act
seaman. He reasoned that the Court could not have considered
the man-made island a vessel because it was permanently secured
to the ocean floor before petitioner was injured. The only other
possible basis for the majority's action, Justice Harlan stated,
was that Grimes' sporadic work for a few hours on the barge,
a minor incident to his normal employment on the tower, could
be used as a justification for transforming him into a seaman.
Although Harlan's analysis was by way of dissent, it seems to
87. An employer-employee relationship must exist between the claimant and
the prime defendant. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783
(1949).

88. 356 U.S. 252 (1958).
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present the accurate view relative to the possibility of a worker
being transformed into a Jones Act seaman by performing incidental seaman's chores while transitorily on board a vessel
when his primary duties are in connection with a permanent
structure. The Robison requirements demand a more or less permanent connection with the vessel, or that the worker perform
a substantial portion of his duties on the vessel, and that his
duties contribute to the mission or function of the vessel. If the
Court was thinking in terms of Grimes' relation to the supply
barge and the six hours of work he performed there it seems
that Justice Harlan's analysis is undoubtedly correct. If the
Robison guidelines apply in such situation the claimant would
fail because of the lack of permanent connection with the vessel
and the fact that he did not perform a "substantial" portion of
his work on the vessel. One aspect that the majority possibly
considered as providing the reasonable basis for the claim, however, is that the tower itself was towed aboard a barge to its
permanent location. Grimes' presence on this barge during
towage and the fact that he performed various duties on the
tower and kept the barge in safe tow probably provided the
required permanency of connection with a "vessel." The majority, therefore, probably was looking to this barge, and not the
supply barge or tower, when it asserted that the facts presented
a sufficient evidentiary basis. Unless the employee normally assigned to a fixed platform performs a substantialportion of his
duties aboard a vessel, therefore, his Jones Act claim will be
defeated.8 9
Because of its lack of clear factual analysis Grimes presents
the possible argument that a fixed platform, because of its location and vulnerability to the perils of the sea, is a "vessel" under
the Jones Act. The court did not designate which "vessel" it was
speaking of-the tower, the supply barge, or the barge which
had towed the tower out to sea. This treatment of the factual
situation by the majority leaves open the argument that since
he was more or less permanently connected with the tower and
not the supply barge the Court must have considered the tower
a "vessel." As mentioned earlier, the holding in Grimes could
be explained on the grounds that Grimes had a more or less permanent connection with the barge that towed the tower out to its
location and performed duties aboard it which "contributed to
its mission." Another possible basis for the holding is that the
majority felt that the jury might infer that Grimes and his fellow
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workers were going to spend a substantial portion of their future
workdays on the supply barge. Explaining the holding on the
basis of the barge which towed the tower to sea instead of on
the basis of the supply barge or tower provides a more consistent
line of reasoning since it has as its justification a more or less
permanent connection with a vessel and duties aboard the vessel
contributing to its function or mission.
The Supreme Court's silence in Grimes as to whether the
tower itself might be considered a vessel was noted in In re
United States Air Force Texas Tower No. Four.90 There a Texas
tower collapsed during a storm injuring several employees. The
Court held the tower not to be a "vessel" within the meaning and
scope of the limitation of liability statute but noted that the Jones
Act has always been liberally construed in reference to the
definition of a vessel. The fixed nature of the tower and its
incapability of being used as a means of transportation over
water, or for purposes of navigation were stressed.
Although there would appear to be significant justification
for enlarging the class of Jones Act vessels to include offshore
fixed platforms this development seems both unlikely and undesirable. In Offshore Co. v. Robison,"' Judge Wisdom noted that
many offshore workers share the same marine risks as traditional sailors and that in many instances the Jones Act seaman
is exposed to even greater hazards. "They run the risk of top
heavy drilling barges collapsing. They run all the risks incident
to oil drilling. ' 92 If the primary reason for extending the Jones
Act is the dangerous aspect of the offshore oil industry and
not just the dangers present because of location at sea, the Act's
remedies should be extended to include almost all offshore oil
workers and not just to those employed on submersible barges
or performing substantial duties aboard a standby vessel. If
the primary dangers to be considered are those stemming from
89. For a consideration of classifying offshore oil workers for purposes of
recovery under the general maritime law alone see Weiss v. Central R.R. of N.J.,
235 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956). Majority held criteria for determining seaman
status under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law to be the same.
Dissent felt that remedy of maintenance and cure should be limited to workers
encountering -the hazards of traditional seamen stemming from permanent connection with vessel. Cf. Matherne v. Superior Oil Co., 207 F. Supp. 591 (E.D.
La. 1962) : offshore oil workers failing to meet the Robison requirements could
proceed under the warranty of seaworthiness with good prospects of recovery
where injury is caused by inadequacy of the vessel's gear and appurtenances.
90. 203 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
91. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
92. Id. at 780.
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offshore drilling it should not matter that the drilling operations
are being conducted aboard a submersible barge, mobile platform or fixed drilling platform, or even on land because the
actual perils from heavy drilling equipment are present in all
four cases. It could also be argued that production platforms
which encase wells producing under very high pressures pose
such a great danger of fire and explosion as to justify Jones
Act remedies for production personnel.
It seems more correct, however, to limit extension of the Jones
Act remedies to situations where the primary dangers stem from
the sea and the character of the structure as a vessel. Even
using Judge Wisdom's very broad test of a vessel-"almost any
structure that once floated or is capable of floating on navigable
waters"-the fixed platform, because of its permanent nature,
fails to qualify as a Jones Act vessel. It seems significant that
the principles concerning vessels under the Jones Act developed
first and that the principles concerning seaman status have
evolved and been refined in the context of the type vessel involved and the particular facts of the cases. The cases reflect
the fact that in practice the view prevails that a workman whose
duties are performed primarily on a fixed platform will generally
fail to produce the evidentiary basis required by Robison and
that a fixed platform is not a "vessel in navigation." 93
Fixed Platform with Tender
The use of a tending vessel to support drilling operations on
fixed platforms also presents special problems. To satisfy the
Robison guidelines it now seems that the worker must have
performed a substantial portion of his duties aboard the tender.
In addition, the actual duties performed must contribute in some
way to the function of the tender or to the accomplishment of
its mission. It is submitted that it would be insufficient that the
worker spent a substantial portion of his time on board the
tender. To permit the case to go to the jury when the worker's
only connection with the vessel is that he eats, sleeps, and occasionally performs incidental duties there seems tantamount
to allowing the jury to find that a mere passenger, such as on
an ocean-going liner, is in fact a Jones Act seaman. Robison
93. Sirmons v. Baxter Drilling Co., 239 F. Supp. 348
platform not a vessel and claimant not a "member of a
Snipes, 186 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. La. 1960) (roughneck
form held to exclusive remedy under Longshoremen's Act
he did not attempt to claim under the Jones Act).

(W.D. La. 1965) (fixed
crew") ; Pure Oil Co. v.
employed on fixed platalthough it appears that
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expressly requires a more or less permanent connection with the
vessel or the performance of a substantial portion of the person's
work on the vessel. Where the worker's permanent connection
with the vessel stems only from the fact that he eats and sleeps
aboard the tender and from time to time is ordered to perform
duties thereon the worker is more correctly a recipient of the
ship's services rather than a seaman contributing to its mission. The Robison guidelines may prove difficult to apply in
given cases because of the endless variety of fact situations
which may arise. However the general test it announces seems
adequate to meet this challenge. It would not seem adequate
that the worker primarily employed on a fixed drilling platform
performs incidental chores aboard the tender such as chipping,
painting, and handling lines. This would even seem to be true in
cases where full days are spent aboard the tender in doing this
type of work because of bad weather or when the vessel is being
moved. Should there be an extended period where such duties
were performed, the court would be faced with a close question. It
must not be forgotten, however, that Robison requires substantial "connection" and "duties contributing to the mission of the
vessel." If a member of the drilling crew is more or less permanently assigned to the tender as a pump operator or mud
mixer and his duties are performed almost exclusively on the
tender there seems to be no problem in meeting the Robison
guidelines. 94 Such an employee who is injured while incidentally
on the fixed platform would still be a seaman if he is acting in
the course and scope of his employment. 95
It seems likely, however, in view of the decision in Ross v.
Delta Drilling Co.,90 that the judge will be liberal in tender cases
and allow them to go to the jury where there is a showing that
some duties were performed on the tender, rather than hold as
94. See Johnson v. Noble Drilling Co., 264 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1966)
(worker primarily assigned to stationary drilling platform who performed only irregular duties aboard tender held not seaman; sole remedy the Longshoremen's
Act) ; Creel v. The Drill Tender Jack Cleverly, 2(4 F. Supp. 98 (W.D. La. 1966)
(member of drilling crew who performed duties almost exclusively on tender prior
to injury held seaman). Cf. Fontenot v. Halliburton Co., 264 F. Supp. 45 (W.D.
La. 1967) (judge used statistical breakdown of worker's time spent in connection
with offshore and inland operations; held not seaman because of lack of more
or less permanent assignment to a specific vessel or group of vessels and failure
to perform a substantial part of his work on a specific vessel or group of vessels).
95. Fact that seaman is injured ashore in course of employment does not
preclude Jones Act recovery. Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129
(1959) ; Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957); O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
96. 213 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1962).
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a matter of law that the worker is not entitled to Jones Act
benefits. It does not seem significant that the tender may be
actually attached to the fixed drilling platform by a ramp and
that it is such an integral part of the overall drilling operations.
The character of the platform remains that of a permanent
structure.
In Ross a roughneck was injured while working on the deck
of the tender. The case was at first allowed to go to the jury
although the claimant performed the duties he was performing
at the time of injury only about once or twice a month. The
judge, trying the case by stipulation, held that Ross was not
entitled to recover under the Jones Act on the ground that his
normal duties and those to which he was more or less permanently assigned were on the fixed platform as a roughneck. Although the claimant lived and ate on the tender and on irregular
occasions performed duties on the tender, he lacked the required
"connection" with the vessel. Ross is significant in that the
judge recognized that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis
for the issue of status to go to the jury although the Robison
guidelines require that substantial duties be performed on the
vessel. The court also disposed of the claimant's alternative
claim for Louisiana Workmen's Compensation by citing Pure
Oil Co. v. Snipes 7 where the Fifth Circuit held that it was the
intention of Congress under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act 8 that the exclusive remedy of non-seamen employees injured on artificial islands and permanent structures on the Continental Shelf be under the Longshoremen's Act.09
97. See note 93 supra.
98. 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) defines the Outer Continental
Shelf as "all submerged lands lying seaward outside of the area of lands beneath
navigable waters." Section 1333(c) provides that compensation for death or disability resulting from any injury from operations conducted on the Continental
Shelf for the purpose of exploiting its natural resources shall be payable under
the Longshoremen's Act. Section 1333(a) (1) extends the Constitution, laws
and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States "to all artificial islands
and fixed structures which may be erected thereon . . . to the same extent as if
the outer Continental Shelf was an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located
within a State."
99. Snipes and Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So. 2d 550 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 175 So. 2d 301 (1965) hold that the effect of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act is to confer exclusive jurisdiction over claims
resulting from injuries on artificial islands and fixed structures erected on the
Continental Shelf in the federal courts. Under the act the sole remedy for
workers not classified as seamen has been held to be the Longshoremen's Act.
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CONCLUSION

Drilling companies seem to be in a dilemma. The only way
to avoid exposure to Jones Act claims would seem to be the utilization of self-contained, fixed drilling platforms. Although
submersible barges and mobile platforms involve higher initial
cost than self-contained permanent platforms, the former methods are favored because they are believed to be more economical
in the long run since one unit can drill several wells. One way
of a least limiting exposure to Jones Act liability is the hiring
of able-bodied seamen to exclusively maintain and perform duties
aboard the tender. Drilling companies are not permitted, however, to hire drilling crew personnel to do the work of Jones
Act seamen aboard the tender and then try to defend themselves by setting up the fact that their primary duties are as
members of the drilling crew and not as members of the vessel's

crew.

00

Extension of the Jones Act by analogy to the hazards encountered by traditional seamen beyond the tender cases to the

fixed platform cases seems undesirable. In view of the justified
liberal interpretation of the Jones Act'0 1 the resulting situation
seems to pivot on the distribution of losses factor. A major
consideration which undoubtedly underlies this area is the extremely hazardous nature of offshore operations, not to mention extremely high overhead costs. Drilling companies simply
take into consideration the extra costs of liability insurance in

their contracts with oil companies.

The oil companies in turn

pass the increased cost to the consumer.

The practical result of

this development in admiralty law seems to be that modern day
100. "[A]n employer who hires men to work on the water on vessels engaged
in navigation and permits them to have such a permanent connection with the
vessel as to expose them to the same hazards of marine service as those shared by all
aboard should not be permitted, by merely restricting their duties or by adopting
particular nomenclature as descriptive of their tasks, to limit his liability to such
employees ...
to the extent prescribed in the Longshoremen's Act", Wilkes v. Mississippi River Sand & Gravel Co., 202 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir. 1953).
101. In Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959), Judge Wisdom
noted that the history of liberal interpretation under the Jones Act had not
prompted congressional amendment restricting coverage of the act. "The absence
of any legislative restriction has enabled the law to develo, naturally along with
the development of unconventional vessels, such as the strange-looking specialized
watercraft designed foi oil operations offshore and in the shallow coastal waters
of the Gulf of Mexico." Id. at 780. "[R]ecognition should and must some day
be given to the fact that the marine petroleum industry is an entirely new, unique,
marine industry which has little or no similarity to those historical activities from
which existing laws . . . have evolved. It cannot be fairly compared with any
other in existence." Denzler, Tidelands Operations Under Coast Guard Regulation,
32 TUL. L. REV. 199, 200 (1958).
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consumers are simply paying the cost of the many essential, as
well as luxurious, products traceable either directly or indirectly
to the marine petroleum industry. It is doubtful that this situation would be tolerated were the oil industry more competitivewere there no tariffs or import quotas. Only because they enjoy
a privileged position can oil companies get prices to cover such
costs and pass the ultimate burden of Jones Act liability on to
the consumer.
Larry P. Boudreaux, Sr.

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS-A HINDSIGHT VIEW OF
TRIAL ATTORNEY EFFECTIVENESS
As a result of federal court decisions extending the right to
counsel in state criminal proceedings, 1 a flood of habeas corpus
2
petitions from state prisoners has come to the federal courts.
Many relate to the lack of counsel at some stage of the criminal
proceedings from arrest 3 to appeal, 4 but a large number of them
complain of the lack of "effective" trial counsel.
The right to effective assistance of counsel was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,5 an extreme
case in which the trial judge had appointed on the morning of
the trial the entire bar of the county to defend a group of Negro
boys accused of raping two white girls. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court, laid down the rather broad pronouncement that failure to make an effective appointment of counsel
violated the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision and
was thus a denial of due process within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment." Justice Black in the later case of Avery
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Symposium, Administration of Criminal Justice, 26 L.A. L. REV. 666, 789 (1966).
2. The right of state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus was broadened
by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Court held that
only state remedies "presently" available need be exhausted before petitioning
for habeas corpus in the federal district courts. This eliminated the need to
"exhaust" all state remedies and to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court before seeking relief by habeas corpus. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 705

(1966).
3. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378

U.S. 478 (1963).
4. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. Id. at 71.

7. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).

